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ISSUER OPPOSITION AND SHAREHOLDER DISAGREEMENT:  
RULE 14A-8(M) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Rule 14a-8 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 authorizes share-
holders to submit proposals for inclusion in the corporation’s proxy state-
ment.1 Typically, the company attaches a statement of opposition object-
ing to the proposal. In doing so, the Rule requires the company to provide 
the statement to the submitting shareholder at least thirty days prior to the 
filing of definitive proxy materials. Shareholders can request that manage-
ment make changes and, in the case of statements considered misleading, 
notify the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)2 
The history of the provision indicates that the SEC has not enforced 
the requirement. Companies do not always provide shareholders with a 
copy of the opposition statement. When they do, shareholders sometimes 
raise concerns over the contents with the SEC. The staff, however, has 
never brought an action against a company for inaccurate disclosure in the 
opposition statement. Instead, the no-action record suggests that, for the 
most part, the staff simply ignores concerns raised by shareholders.   
This paper will examine Rule 14a-8(m). The first part will examine 
the administrative history of the provision. The paper will then consider 
the response by the SEC to claims by shareholders that opposition state-
ments contained false or misleading information. Finally, the paper will 
analyze steps the SEC should take moving forward in regards to the Rule.  
II.ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY 
In adopting Rule 14a-8, the SEC recognized that management had 
the right to oppose shareholder proposals included in the proxy statement.3 
To the extent companies did so, shareholders were allowed to insert a 
statement of support of no more than 100 words, a length that would even-
tually be increased.4 Shareholders, however, had no advance access to 
  
 1. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a–8(m) (2016). 
 2. Id. However, if you believe that the company's opposition to your proposal contains mate-
rially false or misleading statements that may violate our anti-fraud rule, § 240.14a-9, you should 
promptly send to the SEC staff and the company a letter explaining the reasons for your view, along 
with a copy of the company's statements opposing your proposal. 
 3. See SEC Release No. 3347, 1942 WL 34864 at *1 (Dec. 18, 1942) (“3. Stockholders making 
proposals for action which are opposed by management must be given not more than 100 words in the 
proxy in which to state their position, provided the security holder gives the management reasonable 
notice of his intention.”). The SEC originally numbered the Rule X-14a-7. 
 4. Amendments To Rules On Shareholder Proposals, Securities Act Release No. 39093, 1997 
WL 578696 at *42 (Sept. 18, 1997) (“The proposal, including any accompanying supporting state-
ment, may not exceed 500 words.”). 
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management’s opposition statement, with a copy made available only after 
distribution of the proxy materials.5  
In 1977, the SEC held hearings on corporate governance issues,6 in-
cluding the proxy rules.7 The hearings included considerations of “limita-
tions on the extent to which management may comment upon or make 
recommendations with respect to shareholder proposals[.]”8 Commenta-
tors expressed frustration with the lack of opportunity to review the oppo-
sition statement prior to receiving the proxy materials. The inability elim-
inated any chance to object to alleged misstatements before actual distri-
bution.9 The approach left shareholders with the lack of a “workable rem-
edy” other than likely resorting to judicial recourse.10   
In the aftermath of the hearings, the SEC proposed amendments to 
Rule 14a-8 that would allow shareholders an opportunity to review oppo-
sition statements prior to distribution of the proxy materials and report 
false or misleading statements to the agency.11 Doing so would help “to 
assure that shareholders vote on proposals without being misled by one 
party or the other.”12 In addition, the proposal would assist the SEC in 
“detecting inaccuracies.”13 The SEC did not intend to create a debate over 
  
 5. Amendment of Proxy Rules, SEC Release No. 4775, 1952 WL 5254 at *8 (Dec. 11, 1952) 
(“Such statement and request shall be furnished to the management at the same time that the proposal 
is furnished to it . Neither the management nor the issuer shall be responsible for such statement.”) The 
SEC originally numbered the Rule X-14A-8.  
 6. SEC Release No. 9914, 1977 WL 173489 at *1 (Aug. 29, 1977) (“[T]he Commission an-
nounced that it would hold public hearings concerning shareholder communications, shareholders par-
ticipation in the corporate electoral process and corporate governance.”). 
 7. Id. (“Hearings will commence on September 29, 1977 in Washington, D.C., on October 11, 
1977 in Los Angeles, California, on October 18, 1977 in New York, New York and on November 1, 
1977 in Chicago, Illinois.”) 
 8. Id. at  *1, *3 (“for the purpose of giving the Commission the benefit of the views of inter-
ested members of the public with respect to the subjects of shareholder communications, shareholder 
participation in the corporate electoral process and, more generally, corporate governance, in order to 
assist  the Commission in a broad re-examination of Regulation 14”). 
 9. Shareholder Communications, Shareholder Participation In the Corporate Electoral Process 
and Corporate Governance Generally, SEC Release No. 14970, 1978 WL 196325 at *12 (July 18, 
1978) (“[A] number of witnesses opined that under the present system, which does not afford a pro-
ponent an opportunity to review management's statement in opposition until he receives the proxy 
materials in the mail, a proponent does not have a practical means of curing any misstatements[.]”). 
 10. Shareholder Communications, Shareholder Participation In the Corporate Electoral Process 
and Corporate Governance Generally, SEC Release No. 15384, 1978 WL 195744 at *15 (Dec. 6, 
1978) (“[E]ven if judicial review is available it  is questionable in some instances whether it  can pro-
vide a workable remedy. The deliberate pace of a court action may not be well suited … appropriate 
relief may not be available before the meeting.”). 
 11. Supra note 10, at *12, (“Proposed rule 14a-8(e) would, by providing shareholder-propo-
nents with a similar opportunity to object to false or misleading material in management's opposing 
statement before the proxy statement is mailed to shareholders, help to assure that shareholders vote 
on proposals without being misled by one party or the other.”) 
 12. Id. at  *13 (“Commission recognizes that a shareholder-proponent may be in the best posi-
tion to examine the opposing statement because he ordinarily would have sufficient knowledge of the 
facts and circumstances surrounding the subject matter of the proposal to detect possible misstatements 
or omissions.”). 
 13. Id. (“Additionally, in view of the large numbers of proxy statements filed with the Com-
mission each year, the Commission's role in detecting inaccuracies in the opposing statement must 
necessarily be somewhat limited.”).   
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the merits of a shareholder proposal, but merely sought to provide an ave-
nue for receipt of the proponent’s views about what might be false or mis-
leading.14 The SEC reasoned shareholders were in the best position to 
judge the accuracy of opposition statements. 
The final rule required management to provide statements of opposi-
tion no later than ten calendar days prior to the filing of preliminary proxy 
materials.15 The time period was shortened to five days after receipt of a 
revised proposal.16 Shareholders had the right to submit a letter to the SEC 
setting out any false or misleading statements, with a copy provided to the 
company.17 The Commission agreed to closely monitor the effect of the 
rule, implemented the requirement on an “experimental basis”, and prom-
ised to reevaluate the Rule sometime in the future.18 
Shareholders apparently made modest use of the constraint. In 1982, 
Sisters of St. Joseph (Sisters) objected to the opposition statement of Con-
solidated Edison Company of New York (CEC), regarding a proposal af-
fecting low-income families and electricity rates.19 The Sisters argued that 
CEC provided materially false and misleading information and violated 
the relevant timeline with respect to shareholder review of the opposition 
statement.20 Specifically, Sisters noted that CEC had not provided the op-
position statement in time for review. 
The SEC confirmed that the opposition statement appeared to contra-
vene the anti-fraud provision in the proxy rules.21 However, due to “lim-
ited enforcement resources,” the staff declined to recommend an action 
against the company.22 Instead, the staff agreed that the modest showing 
  
 14. Id. (“In this regard, it  is important to note that proposed rule 14a-8(e) is intended to elicit a 
proponent's views only to the extent that these views relate to misstatements or omissions of a factual 
nature; the rule is not intended to provide a forum for further debate…”). 
 15. Supra note 11, at *19 (“If the management intends to include in the proxy statement a state-
ment in opposition to a proposal received from a proponent, it shall not later than ten calendar days 
prior to the date the preliminary copies of the proxy statement and form of proxy are filed pursuant to 
rule 14a-6(a)[.]”). 
 16. Id. (“[I]n the event that the proposal must be revised to be includable, not later than five 
calendar days after [sic] receipt by the issuer of the revised proposal, promptly forward to the propo-
nent a copy of the statement in opposition to the proposal.”). 
 17. Id. (“In the event the proponent believes that the statement in opposition contains materially 
false or misleading statements … the proponent should promptly provide the staff with a letter setting 
forth the reasons for this view and at the same time promptly provide management with a copy of such 
letter."). 
 18. Id. at  *16 (The adoption of the proposal was opposed by some because they “believed it  
would result  in delay and is unnecessary in light of the lack of demonstrated abuses in this area and 
the legal remedies which are already available to shareholder-proponents.”) 
 19. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1982 WL 29313 (June 
2, 1982). 
 20. Id. at  * 1 (citing “certain violations on the Proxy Rules (Regulation 14A).”). 
 21. Id.at *1 (“Based on facts presented in your letter, we would concur in your view that the 
Company failed to comply with Rule 14a–8(e) and that the thrust of its statement in opposition to the 
proposal is contrary to Rule 14a–9.”). 
 22. Id. 
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of support by shareholders would not be a basis for exclusion of the pro-
posal the following year.23 CEC disagreed with the determination and un-
successfully sought reconsideration.24 The Sisters submitted but withdrew 
the same proposal the following year.25  
Similarly, in Control Data Corporation (CDC), the proposal ad-
dressed the treatment of former employees in South Korea.26 The share-
holder asserted that the prior year’s opposition statement contained false 
or misleading statements and was part of a “carefully crafted effort to dis-
credit” the proponents and their organizations.27 The staff agreed that 
“portions of [the prior year’s] statement in opposition to the proposal may 
have been contrary to Rule 14a–9.”28 As a result, the staff concurred that 
“it would be inappropriate for the Company to rely on the 1984 vote for 
excluding the proposal . . . .”29  
Finally, in at least one instance, the staff received but failed to re-
spond to allegations of false material in an opposition statement. The Cen-
tral Pension Fund of the International Union of Operating Engineers and 
Participating Employees (Central) alleged that the opposition statement 
submitted by Phelps Dodge Corporation (PDC) contained false infor-
mation.30 Central requested the SEC review the statements for language 
contrary to the Rules.31 Apparently the Company never received a re-
sponse.32  
  
 23. Id. at  *1 (“Accordingly, we hereby inform the Company that in the Division's view the 1982 
vote on this proposal will not apply for omitting the same or substantially the same proposal in future 
years under subparagraph (c)(12) of Rule 14a–8.”). 
 24. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1982 WL 29822 (Nov. 
8, 1982). 
 25. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1983 WL 30945 (Mar. 
11, 1983). 
 26. Control Data Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1985 WL 53921 at *3 (Mar. 4, 1985) (“I am 
deeply concerned about the situation of your former employees in Korea. For this reason I am filing 
the attached shareholder resolution.”). 
 27. Id. at  *11(“As these four examples demonstrate, CDC's Statement in Opposition was a care-
fully crafted effort to discredit the 1984 proponents and other organizations which might support their 
resolution. By accusing these groups of spreading false and misleading information, CDC has itself 
violated Rule 14a–9.”).   
 28. Id. at  *1.  
 29. Id. (“Accordingly, we do not believe that the management may rely upon Rule 14a–8(c)(12) 
as a basis for omitting the proposal.”). 
 30. Phelps Dodge Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1985 WL 54058 (Mar. 26, 1985). 
 31. Id. at  *4 (“Pursuant to Rule 14a–8(e), proponent believes that the Company's statement in 
opposition contains a misleading statement within the meaning of Rule 14a–9.”). 
 32. Id. at  *1 (“There appears to be some basis for your opinion that the proposal may be ex-
cluded under Rule 14a–8(c)(7), since it  appears to deal with a matter relating to the Company's ordi-
nary business operations[.]”). In other instances, the staff apparently failed to respond. See Am. Ex-
press Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1995 WL 34061 (Jan. 30, 1995); See also N. Bancshares Inc., SEC 
No-Action Letter, 1998 WL 40249 (Jan. 29, 1998). 
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The staff, therefore, either ignored shareholder allegations or sug-
gested that the only penalty would be the inapplicability of the “resubmis-
sion” exclusion.33 In cases where companies sought omission of resubmit-
ted proposals because of inadequate support the prior year, shareholders 
sometimes argued against the exclusion by asserting that the prior year’s 
opposition statement contained false disclosure. The approach, however, 
rarely succeeded.   
A shareholder resubmitted a proposal seeking to require Union Car-
bide to provide “immediate humanitarian relief to the Bhopal victims.”34 
The company sought exclusion arguing that the proposal had received in-
adequate support the prior year.35 The shareholder asserted that the oppo-
sition statement contained false and misleading information.36 The SEC 
ignored the arguments of the shareholder and allowed the exclusion of the 
proposal under the resubmission section.37   
Similarly, in a letter to IBM, shareholders sought to avoid exclusion 
because of an allegedly false statement of opposition. In this case, how-
ever, the staff expressly addressed the allegations:   
“We are formally responding to your arguments that the Company’s 
statement in opposition contained false and misleading state-
ments notwithstanding our policy summarized above because you 
contend that use of such statements precludes the Company from rely-
ing on rule 14a-8(c)(12). The staff has determined, after again care-
fully reviewing all relevant information, that the subject portions of the 
Company's statement in opposition contained in its 1988 proxy mate-
rials did not contravene rule 14a-9.”38 
The “experiment” in providing shareholders with early access to the 
opposition statement lasted until 1987 when the SEC again amended the 
provision.39 The modified rule required companies to send opposition 
statements to shareholders not later than thirty days prior to the filing of 
  
 33. § 240.14a-8(i)(12) (A proposal may be excluded if it  received less than 3% of the vote after 
being proposed once within 5 years, less than 6% after being proposed twice, or less than 10% after 
being proposed three times.). 
 34. Union Carbide Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1991 WL 176577 at *1 (Jan. 30, 1991). 
 35. Id. (“The Corporation believes that the 1991 proposal may be omitted under Rule 14a–
8(c)(12) because it deals with substantially the same subject matter as proposals submitted by the same 
two Proponents for the 1989 annual meeting of stockholders”). 
 36. Id. (“ the vote on the prior submission was not a representative vote because the issuer's 
Statement in Opposition was misleading.”). 
 37. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1989 WL 246638 at *1 (Dec. 27, 1989) 
(“There appears to be some basis for your opinion that the proposal may be omitted from the Compa-
ny's proxy materials under rule 14a-8(c)(12)[.]”). 
 38. Id. at  *3 (The actual letter could not be discovered. This is a quote from an SEC letter, 
quoted in the company’s letter.). 
 39. Proxy Rules; Amendments To Eliminate Filing Requirements for Certain Preliminary 
Proxy Material; Amendments With Regard to Rule 14a-8, Shareholder Proposals, SEC Release No. 
25217, 1987 WL 847542 at *1 (Dec. 21, 1987) (“The Commission today announced the adoption of 
amendments to the proxy rules to eliminate the filing of preliminary proxy and information statements 
under certain circumstances.”). 
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definitive proxy materials.40 Proponents notifying the SEC of false disclo-
sure were required to submit a copy of the opposition statement with the 
claim.41 Inclusion would prevent delays in review.    
In 1997, the Commission  proposed to rewrite Rule 14a-8 using a 
question and answer format.42 The SEC requested comment on whether to 
eliminate 14a-8(e) altogether.43 The release noted shareholders rarely used 
the provision and, when they did, “staff review rarely result[ed] in modi-
fications . . . .”44 Alternatively, the SEC proposed revisions of the require-
ment, including language that encouraged parties to work out their differ-
ences.  
Commenters objected to the removal of the subsection because, alt-
hough rarely utilized in practice, it detered companies from including ma-
terially false or misleading information in the opposition statements.45 At 
least one commentator acknowledged a lack of awareness that the require-
ment even existed.46 The final amendments adopted the question and an-
swer format and renumbered the subsections but otherwise made no sub-
stantive changes in the opposition statement requirement.  
III. STAFF INTERPRETATION OF NO-ACTION LETTERS 
Since these amendments, few no-action letters have addressed claims 
of misleading disclosure in the opposition statement.47 The staff, however, 
  
 40. Id. at  *6 (“Paragraph (e) of Rule 14a-8 is amended to require that, not later than 30 calendar 
days prior to the filing of definitive proxy material with the Commission, the registrant forward to a 
shareholder proponent a copy of any statement in opposition to the proponent's resolution that the 
registrant intends to include in the proxy statement.”). 
 41. Id. at  *6 (“In addition, the Commission is amending the last paragraph of Rule 14a-8(e) to 
require that a proponent who believes that the registrant's statement in opposition is false and mislead-
ing … provide a copy of the statement in opposition to the Commission . . . .”). 
 42. Supra note 5, at *1, (“We propose to recast rule 14a-8 into a Question & Answer format 
that both shareholders and companies should find easier to follow, and to modify the rule to address 
concerns raised by both shareholders and companies. We also propose revisions to related rules.”). 
 43. Id. at *24 (“Accordingly, we propose to eliminate the mechanism provided by current rule 
14a-8(e). We request your comments on this proposal.”). 
 44. Id. (“In our experience, only a handful of shareholders make use of the mechanism each 
year, and the staff review rarely results in modifications to the company's statement.”). 
 45. Amendments To Rules On Shareholder Proposals, SEC Release No. 23200, 1998 WL 
254809 at *13 (May 21, 1998) (“A number of commenters from the shareholder community opposed 
elimination of these procedures because they believed that the potential for proponent objections de-
ters companies from making materially false or misleading statements, and encourages negotiation 
between the company and proponent.”). 
 46. Comment Letter from Arthur R. Mixon, Stockholder Proposals (Oct. 7, 
1997), https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s72597/mixon1.txt . 
 47. Liberty All-Star Growth Fund, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2012 WL 2150789 at *1 (May 
10, 2012) (“We note that the Fund will have an opportunity to include in its proxy statement arguments 
reflecting its own point of view on the Proposal.”). Companies have also recognized their own right 
to do as much. See also, AT&T Wireless Services, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2003 WL 262467 at 
*7 (Jan. 24, 2003) (Management does not "claim" the right to advise against a vote in favor of share-
holder sponsored proposals; it  has the right, a right conferred by Proxy Rule 14a-8(m).). Shareholder 
proponents, have also used the rule to instruct the company to use (m). Avaya Inc., SEC No-Action 
Letter, 2001 WL 1549132 at *27 (Dec. 04, 2001) (“Rather, the right avenue for Avaya if it  disagrees 
with the Proposal is to include a statement in opposition, as contemplated by Rule 14a-8(m).”). In 
some instances, companies have tried to impose unilateral restrictions on the use of the opposition 
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reiterated the right of shareholders to bring false statements to the attention 
of the SEC. In Legal Bulletin 14, the Staff stated: 
If a shareholder believes that a company's statement in opposition is 
materially false or misleading, the shareholder may promptly send a 
letter to us and the company explaining the reasons for his or her view, 
as well as a copy of the proposal and statement in opposition. Just as a 
company has the burden of demonstrating that it is entitled to exclude 
a proposal, a shareholder should, to the extent possible, provide us with 
specific factual information that demonstrates the inaccuracy of the 
company's statement in opposition.48  
Companies and shareholders were encouraged “to work out” differences 
before contacting the staff.49  
In some cases the approach worked as desired. Shareholders raised 
objections and companies altered disclosure. In a 2000 no-action letter, 
College Retirement Equities Fund (CREF) opposed a proposal that would 
require the sale of shares in certain companies. The record contained a 
reference to changes made in the opposition statement by the company 
after learning of the shareholder’s objections.50  
More commonly, however, the no action record suggested a low suc-
cess rate for shareholders when raising concerns about the accuracy of an 
opposition statement. Likewise, the record reflects a lack of response on 
the part of the staff to claims by shareholders of violations of the rule or 
the existence of inaccurate disclosure. For the most part, the staff simply 
ignored the concerns.   
In some instances, shareholders alleged that they did not receive the 
statement or did not receive the statement in a timely fashion.51 In Nabors 
Industries, for example, the shareholder charged that: 
The Funds submitted the Proposal to Nabors on November 29, 2011. 
Since that date, the Funds have received no draft of Nabors' Statement, 
  
statement by shareholders. See, e.g., State St. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2005 WL 544212 at *2 
(Mar. 1, 2005) (“I deem myself to be entirely at liberty to share the contents of the registrant's Rule 
14a-8(m) statement with other shareholders. Indeed, I view it  as a breach of the fiduciary duties of 
loyalty and care for the Directors to conceal their true reasons for opposing my shareholder proposal 
from the body of shareholders.”). 
 48. SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 14 (July 13, 2001). 
 49. Nabors Indus., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2013 WL 1682464 at *1 (Apr. 15, 2013) (“We 
encourage shareholders and companies to work out these differences before contacting us.”). 
 50. College Ret. Equities Fund, SEC No-Action Letter, 2000 WL 1280910 at *8 (“In a letter 
dated 27 September 1999, Abby Ingber sent me a response (cc:ed to Kevin M. 
Kirchoff, SEC) in which CREF agreed to a [sic] revise the statement in ques-
tion.”). 
 51. Supra note 49, at *5; See also Raytheon Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2008 WL 887164 at 
*5 (Mar. 28, 2005) (“following the delivery of the broker letter to the company in accordance with 
Raytheon Company (February 13, 2008), the company failed to forward an opposition state-
ment.”); Plymouth Rubber Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1998 WL 60796 (Feb. 4, 1998). 
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and have been given no opportunity to comment. Rather. [sic] I am 
informed, we discovered from our own search that Nabors filed its pre-
liminary proxy materials with the Division on April 9, 2012, and then 
filed its definitive proxy materials today. When we reviewed those 
proxy materials, we found that Nabors' Statement in Opposition con-
tained untrue comments, which due to Nabors' misconduct, the Funds 
never got a chance to correct. I have reviewed the relevant facts and 
law, and in my opinion, under the facts and law, action by the Division 
to require Nabors to correct its proxy materials before its June 5, 2012 
annual meeting is appropriate and necessary, to redress Nabors' viola-
tions of law.52 
The Company acknowledged the violation but argued that shareholders 
were not “harmed” by the “error.”53 The shareholder asked that staff con-
sider a “formal referral for enforcement action” or the issuance of “a public 
letter of warning to the Company . . . .”54  The record contains no response 
from the staff.   
Similarly, the staff did not responded to allegations made by share-
holders of misleading disclosure in the opposition statement. In Drexler 
Technology Corporation (Drexler), the shareholder proponent alleged that 
the opposition statement contained false or misleading statements. Drexler 
denied the allegations and sent the material, including a copy of the oppo-
sition statement, directly to the SEC.55  Again the staff did not address the 
issue.     
In Nabors Industries Inc., the New York City Pension Funds (the 
Funds), the shareholder contested the accuracy of the opposition state-
ment.56 The shareholder apparently tried unsuccessfully to negotiate 
changes in the language. As the shareholder explained: 
[T]he NYC Funds first wrote to Nabors detailing the Funds' concerns 
about misstatements in Nabors' Statement in Opposition, and suggest-
  
 52. Supra note 49 at *5. 
 53. Supra note 49, at *9 (“The simple answer is that we did indeed neglect to provide the Share-
holder Proponent the 30 days called for by Rule 14a-8.”). 
 54. Id. at  *11. 
 55. Id. at  *2 (“The Proponent has asserted that the Company's statement opposing his proposal 
is false and misleading, … The Company denies that this is the case. In order to avoid any miscom-
munication, we enclose for your review a copy of the Company's opposition statement and its corre-
spondence to the Proponent…”). 
 56. Supra note 49 at *1 (“This year, the Company did not repeat that same violation of Rule 
14a-8, but it is insisting, in violation of Rule 14a-8, on mailing uncorrected proxy materials with untrue 
allegations. The Funds request that the Division take appropriate action in advance of Nabors' 2013 
annual meeting of shareholders.”); See also, N. Bancshares, Inc., 1998 WL 40249 at *10 (Jan. 29, 
1998) (“The writer has no record of receiving, not later than 30 calendar days prior to the filing, a copy 
of the statement in opposition to the proposal, as required by Rule 14a-8(e).”). 
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ing specific, narrow changes that the Company could make to its State-
ment to resolve those concerns completely. The Company, in re-
sponse, rejected making any changes whatsoever to its Statement.57 
Noting that the “Staff may take action to enforce Rule 14-8 if a company 
and a proponent cannot resolve any issues about the opposing statement” 
the shareholder specifically sought resolution by the Division. The Staff 
apparently never responded to the letter.58   
In some instances, proponents have noted the staff’s willingness to address 
concerns over accuracy raised by companies but not by shareholders. In 
Mattel, the company sought to exclude portions a shareholder’s supporting 
statement for being false or misleading.59 In defending the statement, the 
proponent pointed out the disparity in treatment: “Neither the company 
nor its proxy provided one example of any company being required to 
change or omit text from a management opposition statement to a share-
holder proposal and together they have experience with hundreds of man-
agement opposition statements.”60 
IV. ANALYSIS 
The no-action record suggests that the staff does little to enforce the 
obligation of issuers to provide opposition statements or to ensure their 
accuracy. Evidence suggests that companies at least sometimes violate 
Rule 14a-8(m) by failing to provide copies of the opposition statement or 
failing to do so in a timely fashion. Likewise, the record suggests that the 
staff has not responded to a shareholder’s allegations of false disclosure in 
the opposition statement by requiring changes, bringing an enforcement 
action, or issuing a letter of admonition. In contrast, the staff regularly re-
quires changes in supporting statements submitted by shareholders.61 
  
 57. Supra note 49, at *2, 4 (“The Office of Chief Counsel did not, in fact, reject the observations 
in the Company's statement in opposition; rather, they [sic] determined that the statements contained 
in the proposal do not meet the high threshold for a “materially false or misleading” statement … It 
does not preclude the Board from stating its opinions in response to the proposal.”). 
 58. Several occasions exist where shareholders have requested the SEC review opposition state-
ments but their truthfulness is never reviewed because the proposal is excluded under one of the other 
rules. See, e.g., Drexler Tech. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2001 WL 959327 at *1–5 (Aug, 23, 
2001). 
 59. Mattel Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2013 WL 6701960 at *1 (Jan. 6, 2014) (“We are unable 
to conclude that you have demonstrated objectively that the proposal or the portions of the supporting 
statement you reference are materially false or misleading.”). 
 60. Id. at  *3; See also Am. Home Prods. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2002 WL 377549 at *5 
(Feb. 27, 2002) (The record contains evidence of unsuccessful efforts to work out concerns over the 
accuracy of the opposition statement. “There has been no company response to the request to make 
the following changes to prevent false and/or misleading text [sic] in the company rule 14a-8 opposing 
statement. The following changes are needed in the company opposing text … This is to request that 
the company be contacted to make the above changes.” The letters in the no action file include no 
indication that Wyeth made changes as a result  of the shareholder concerns.) 
 61. See, e.g., Watts Indus., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1998 WL 388487 at *1 (July 10, 1998); 
See also The Boeing Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2003 WL 942871 at *1 (Feb. 26, 2003); See also 
Caterpillar Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2003 WL 40628 at *1 (Jan. 3, 2003). 
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This lack of enforcement carries costs. The approach gives the ap-
pearance that the staff does not enforce Rule 14a-8 in an evenhanded man-
ner. Moreover, companies have no incentive to “work out their differ-
ences” because they know the staff will take no action if they fail.62  
The staff should take steps to enforce the requirement. Doing so 
would entail an examination of shareholder claims regarding the accuracy 
of the opposition statements. Merely acknowledging and reviewing letters 
submitted by shareholders would send a signal of seriousness by the SEC. 
To the extent, however, that the staff in fact uncovered violations of the 
rule or misleading disclosure, additional steps should be taken, including, 
where appropriate, a recommendation to the Division of Enforcement.  
Short of that, the staff could insist on changes to the disclosure, something 
that could delay the distribution of the proxy materials. Even the modest 
sanction associated with the inconvenience of a delayed distribution would 
likely encourage issuers to attempt to “work out their differences” with 




 62. See, e.g., Supra note 48, at *1. 
 †  J.D. Candidate at the University of Denver Sturm College of Law, May 2016. 
